not disengaged questions about the possibility of knowledge in general, but situated interpretations of how we ought to understand specific aspects of the scientifically accultured world we live in.
My second concern addresses not what science can tell us about the world, but what our theories of scientific knowledge tell us about ourselves as knowers. I emphatically do not claim that science cannot reach "outside" our webs of belief and desire to disclose things in the world. The mistake is instead to conceive of knowing as enclosed "inside" such a web in the first place. Here I find a residual tension between Gutting's rejection of representationalism, and his continued espousal of realism. which still connotes a correspondence between "internal" belief or meaning and "external" object. Here also we still have something to learn from Heidegger's reconception of intentionality as being-in-the-world, which denies any semantic, psychological or social intermediaries between us and the world. For Heidegger, the issue between realists and "idealists" never gets off the ground.
This second concern arises specifically in Gutting's paper when he insists upon distinguishing the natural sciences as the locus of his methodological realism. My point is not that we should, after all, equate the "cognitive successes" of sociologists and economists with those of physicists and biologists; rather, I think we may have misunderstood the successes of the latter. The standard story differentiating the natural from the human sciences is familiar: the natural world seems causally tidier than the social world, which is fraught with meaning, and includes objects of inquiry who talk back. The unspoken presumption, however, is that what the sciences disclose is the "natural world." Recent science studies indicate what successful scientists already knew, that the focus of natural scientific inquiry is a work-world, whose material and sociocultural articulation is thoroughly intertwined. That is partly because successful research requires an appropriately organized community, as Peter Galison's studies of the shifting social and material scale of 20th Century physics show especially clearly. But it is 1 also because the point of specific inquiries depends upon their culturally situated significance. Scientific inquiry can never be satisfied merely with truth; what matters in science is interesting truths, elegant theories, powerful insights, productive experimental systems, robust models, and important achievements. 2 Recognizing that natural scientific work is fraught with meaning does not take us back toward social constructivism, however. It would do so only if human communities (or agents) were fully authoritative over what is at issue and at stake in what they do. What is interesting, elegant, powerful, productive, robust, or important is not simply given by nature, but neither is it entirely up to "us." The presumption that meaning is fully determined by human beings (whether individually or collectively) often plays a prominent role within the human sciences. But my suspicion, although I cannot even begin to defend the point here, is that some of the predictive and interpretive difficulties of the human sciences stem from this: there is no "social world," at least not in the sense of a relatively autonomous field of meaning and action. Social practices, meanings, and stakes are materially situated in ways that need greater recognition within the human sciences. My final concern starts from Gutting's insight that empiricist scruples may reflect an understandable caution about accepting "weird" theoretical entities or properties. This insight sorely needs historical contextualization. After all, the boundary between the familiar world of everyday experience and the "weird" has not always been located in quantum physics and general relativity. The unimaginably strange and wonderful has at various times been found in the superlunary sphere, the vitality of living things, magnetism, atoms, or "microscopic" organisms. The partial assimilation of these phenomena has materially and conceptually 3 transformed "the world we experientially live in." In retrospect, however, their apparent "weirdness" has turned out to have been all too often an artifact of the conceptual configuration within which these phenomena were initially encountered, an artifact which subsequent conceptual transformation partly dissolves.
A reader of contemporary anglophone philosophy might well add "normativity" to the list of suspiciously weird properties sometimes posited to make sense of familiar features of our experience. In a world of causal powers and reliable mechanisms, the intentionality and accountability of thought, meaning and action have come to seem increasingly weird. In such a world, how could one thing come to be "about" or responsible to another? I mention this seemingly tangential point, because I think it is not after all so far removed from the "weirdness" of quantum mechanical phenomena. In suggesting such a connection, I am not thinking of those interpretations of quantum mechanics that would explain the strange by the mysterious, through an appeal to consciousness or the like. Rather, I am noticing that normativity and quantum physics come to seem "weird" against the same background conceptualization of causal powers and real properties. My underlying suspicion, prompted in part by Karen Barad's reflections on Niels Bohr, is that more adequate conceptualization of the quantum world and of agency and material practice will dissolve some of the "weirdness" now attributed to both normativity and microphysics. I cannot explore that suspicion in this paper, but I can suggest a relevant 4 addendum to Gutting's discussion: inferences from the familiar to the apparently "weird" should sometimes prompt conceptual reform instead of just theoretical caution.
I conclude with a brief summary of the common import of my three concerns. Gary Gutting is right to reject skeptical challenges to the "reality" of unobservable entities, to the importance of scientific prediction and control, and to the existence of worldly constraints upon Indeed, as Lorraine Daston, "The Nature of Nature in Early Modern Europe," Configurations 6 3 (1998):149-72, has compellingly shown, even the classification of the "weird" has changed within the modern scientific tradition, as the concept of the "preternatural" has disappeared, and those of the "supernatural," "unnatural," and "artificial" have changed their meanings and referents.
Karen Barad, "Meeting the Universe Halfway: Realism and Social Constructivism Without , Dordrecht: Reidel, 1996, p. 161-94. 4 the sociological or "strong poetic" imagination. His carefully circumscribed realism is a valuable antidote to these philosophical maladies, and admirably serves this role without carrying much tendentious philosophical baggage. In the end, however, I suspect that the best response to these maladies would not be to seek a better version of scientific realism, but to attempt a more richly detailed philosophical engagement with scientific practices. My hope is that we would thereby get beyond the debates over realism, and toward a constructive conceptual reconfiguration of meaning, agency, causality, and the world.
